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ARTICLES

SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST
THROUGH LEGISLATIVE PRESSURE: A
CASE STUDY OF THE COASE THEOREM AS
APPLIED TO THE COLLEGE BASKETBALL
SHOE SCANDAL
STEPHEN F. ROSS & MILES J. GUENO*

I. INTRODUCTION
Recent federal prosecutions reveal widespread corruption in youth
basketball.1 Illegal fraud conspiracies are driven by major shoe companies, who
seek an unfair advantage years later in signing National Basketball Association
(NBA) stars to lucrative endorsement deals. The result victimizes many players,
and it distorts how teenagers train and develop. Youth basketball could be
reformed by direct government regulation. Most corruption could also be
eliminated by an agreement between the NBA and its players association, the
National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), to reshape how endorsement
deals are made. Such an agreement would likely be efficient and beneficial to
clubs, NBA players, and most youth basketball stakeholders serving legitimate
interests. However, it is virtually certain that—absent outside help—the parties
would never agree. This Article applies the principles of the original Coase

* Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of Sports in Society, The Pennsylvania State
University, and J.D. candidate, 2020, Penn State Law. We thank participants in a faculty seminar at Penn
State, a workshop for Justice Ginsburg’s former clerks, and a session of the Western Economics Association
International for their feedback, and Joel Litvin and Mark Storslee for detailed comments on earlier drafts.
1. Will Hobson & Kevin Armstrong, All Three Defendants Found Guilty of Wire Fraud in College
Basketball Corruption Trial, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/
all-three-defendants-found-guilty-of-wire-fraud-in-college-basketball-corruption-trial/2018/10/24/fba5b866d7be-11e8-a10f-b51546b10756_story.html?utm_term=.77533a1cf292.

ROSS – ARTICLE 30.1

10

1/10/2020 12:07 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1

Theorem2 to explain why. It then builds upon Coase’s insights to suggest that,
in a context of imperfect but attainable information, and significant-but-notinsurmountable bargaining costs, legislative pressure is an effective public
policy strategy to facilitate a private agreement that is efficient and socially
beneficial.
Recently, shoe company executives and college basketball coaches were
convicted of conspiracy to violate federal anti-fraud statutes by funneling
money to star high school players’ families and advisors. The conspiracy was
designed to induce players to attend specific universities with an endorsement
relationship with the shoe company, and to steer these players toward selecting
agents or financial managers likely to induce their future clients to sign
endorsement contracts with the shoe companies.3 The first trial in fall 2018
resulted in convictions of two Adidas executives and an agent for fraud relating
to under-the-table payments to families of star recruits to affirm their
commitment to the Adidas-affiliated University of Louisville.4 The trial
evidence showed that the defendants paid families of five recruits amounts
ranging from $2,500 to $100,000.5
Brian Bowen, Jr., an elite high school basketball player whose parents
accepted a $100,000 payment by Adidas officials to commit to the University
of Louisville, alleges that Adidas officials, Amateur Athletic Union (AAU)
coaches, financial advisers, and college coaches conspired to commit bribery

2. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter
Coase].
3. United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining the alleged scheme as:
“defendants and their co-conspirators [paying] bribes to certain high school basketball players bound for
NCAA Division I universities and/or their families in exchange for commitments by the students to
matriculate at specific universities and then retain Dawkins' services and sign with Company–1 [Adidas] once
they turned professional”). By infringing NCAA rules, the conspirators defrauded Louisville and the
University of Miami, who would not have awarded scholarships to those recruits if they had known about the
illicit payments. Id. The theory that the universities—whose coaches were active participants in the
conspiracy and who profited by recruiting these star athletes—were the victims of fraud is controversial and
is beyond the scope of this Article. For reasons the government’s attorneys did not articulate, the claim that
the victims were universities seeking to recruit the athletes in a non-corrupt manner was not raised. Nor did
the prosecution pursue the argument that the athletes themselves were victims as the motivation to steer them
to business managers and agents who would lead them to sign contracts with a particular shoe company was
not fully disclosed. See, e.g., Gentry Estes, College Basketball’s Trap: How Agents and Shoe Companies
Team Up to Exploit Athletes, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.ksdk.com/article/sports/
ncaab/college-basketballs-trap-how-agents-and-shoe-companies-team-up-to-exploit-athletes/63-523407036
(explaining players often do not realize they are “being played” by shoe company representatives and coaches
or family members).
4. Hobson & Armstrong, supra note 1.
5. Id.
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and fraud.6 The scheme’s purpose was to induce elite high school basketball
players to play at certain universities for their own profit.7 Further, the
complaint alleges that the concerted scheme caused disadvantaged high school
athletes, like Bowen, to lose (a) their eligibility, (b) the funds necessary to
further their education and (c) the opportunity to develop their basketball talents
at the collegiate level.8
These payments arise in the context of the global industry of athletic shoe
marketing. A cornerstone of the marketing strategy for major athletic shoe and
apparel companies, such as Nike, Adidas, and Under Armour (hereafter referred
collectively as “shoe companies”), is to obtain endorsements from star
basketball players. Competition for star basketball players commences at the
high school level.9 This is because an astounding number of players who choose
to participate with youth clubs sponsored by a particular shoe company choose
to attend universities who are officially sponsored by the same company, and an
astounding number of NBA players choose to endorse the shoe company
sponsoring their college team.10 Rivalry among the shoe companies is fierce,
and exists in the context of regulations adopted by the member schools of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) that prohibit players from
signing endorsement contracts if they wish to play college basketball within the
NCAA.11 Because NCAA rules preclude an immediate commercial relationship
between shoe companies and collegiate athletes, shoe companies see an
enormous advantage if they can influence players in high school to attend
universities with whom they have sponsorship relationships.12 The advantages
shoe companies gain from this tactic include: (a) profits from the success of
sponsored college teams,13 (b) increased profits from promoting top high school
6. Complaint (Jury Trial Demanded) at 1-5, 147, Bowen v. Adidas America, Inc., No. 3:18-3118-JFA,
2018 WL 6061800 (D. S.C. Nov. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Bowen Complaint].
7. Id. at 118–22.
8. Id. at 124.
9. Estes, supra note 3.
10. Id. (“Nike colleges landed more than 85 percent of the five-star prospects who have signed with a
school since 2003, and roughly 75 percent of all of those five-star players who reached the NBA wear or have
worn Nike”).
11. NCAA, 2017-18 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.1.2.4.11, at 67 (Aug. 1, 2017) (stating a
prospective student-athlete may not “enter into an arrangement . . . with an apparel or equipment manufacturer
or distributor that permits the prospective student-athlete to select apparel and equipment items from a
commercial establishment of the manufacturer or distributor[.]”).
12. Bowen Complaint, supra note 6, at 57.
13. Will Hobson, Inside the Basketball Black Market That Put Adidas in the FBI’s Crosshairs, WASH.
POST, Oct. 1, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/all-three-defendants-found-guilty-ofwire-fraud-in-college-basketball-corruption-trial/2018/10/24/fba5b866-d7be-11e8-a10f
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recruits wearing their brand,14 and (c) an advantage over rivals in signing future
NBA stars to endorsement contracts upon turning professional.15
Under-the-table payments are problematic for many reasons, even for those
who do not subscribe to the NCAA’s view that college athletes should not be
paid. The business model supporting these payments distorts the process by
which elite teenagers select colleges, and creates strong incentives for coaches,
families, and advisors to steer newly-professional players to sign endorsement
contracts with the favored company, even if not in the athlete’s best interest. It
also creates a structure where many elite players are trained and developed by
those primarily interested in gaining a competitive advantage in signing NBA
stars to endorsement deals, rather than the interests of the players. Finally, the
business model also results in less endorsement money for established NBA
players, whose endorsements actually drive shoe sales.16
Solutions to this problem include everything from eradicating poverty,
abolishing the NCAA, publicly funding youth basketball as a well-regulated
competition under the aegis of USA Basketball, or direct federal regulation of
youth coaches, agents and managers, and shoe company contracts. However, a
less radical intervention may be required.
Most of this corruption could be eliminated if NBA players were
compensated for endorsements under a scheme where they collectively agreed
not to endorse shoe companies unless they were the official sponsor of the club
for which they play. Under this scheme, a significant portion of the money now
used to lure youth to sign with designated colleges would go directly to NBA
clubs in the form of official sponsorships that would skyrocket in value; most
of these funds would then be redistributed pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement to the NBPA and then redistributed by them back to the players. As
b51546b10756_story.html?utm_term=.77533a1cf292. “For Nike, Adidas and Under Armour, grass-roots
basketball is an educated gamble—money spent in the hope that, among thousands of teenagers playing in
their leagues, a few will become recognizable stars for their sponsored college teams and develop into NBA
players worthy of endorsement deals. The overarching strategy is to cast a wide net and hopefully attract the
next generational talent who will develop a lifelong affinity for the brand—and sell truckloads of shoes.” Id.
14. Matthew Kish, Exclusive: Adidas Drops Bid to Extend NBA Deal, Redraws Basketball Strategy,
PORTLAND BUS. J. (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/threads_and_laces/2015/03/
exclusive-adidas-drops-nba-bid-redraws-basketball.html (explaining that Adidas is implementing a new
strategy by targeting their marketing efforts on promoting Adidas through high school kids. Chris Grancio,
Adidas's global basketball general manager, explains, “[w]e haven't been able to elevate our brand for the
basketball consumer that we're targeting. We ultimately decided that we would change our investment strategy
and invest more players on the court.”).
15. Hobson, supra note 13.
16. Cameron Chung, Top 4 Sports Agent Scandals, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Aug. 18, 2017),
http://sportsagentblog.com/2017/08/18/top-5-sports-agent-scandals/ (illustrating how “UCLA basketball star
Tyler Honeycutt, [] accepted over $55,000 from agent Noah Lookofsky during his two years in LA and even
while still in high school[,]” then decided to employ another agent upon reaching the NBA.)
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a result, young players would make less-distorted decisions about colleges, and
new professionals would select agents and managers acting solely in their own
interest. Elite teenagers may see fewer opportunities for free travel and apparel,
and some families will see less money in under-the-table payments, but players
would continue to participate in less-corrupt youth competitions and would
henceforth receive training designed to maximize their own development rather
than their club’s brand.
The insights of Ronald Coase, the Nobel-prize winning pioneer in the field
of law and economics, explain why the parties will never agree voluntarily to
the proposed scheme, even though NBA players and clubs would arguably be
better off. Coase is famous for his theorem that an efficient result will be
obtained regardless of the legal assignments of rights and duties, if the relevant
parties have perfect information and there are no transactional or bargaining
costs.17 Less attention is given to the clear corollary to this theorem, which
Coase also articulated: where the parties lack information, or where substantial
bargaining costs exist, the parties cannot be expected to reach the optimal result,
and so the law will affect the parties behavior and should be tailored to reach an
efficient result.18 Even less attention is given to the intermediate case, where
information asymmetries and bargaining costs inhibit an efficient agreement;
the parties in this case may be induced by external pressure to overcome these
challenges and reach an efficient solution.
Coase posited two cases to illustrate his theorem. In one, a farmer’s corn is
destroyed by an adjoining rancher’s cows wandering through her crops. If the
efficient solution is to build a fence, and the efficient fence-builder is the farmer,
the farmer will build the fence regardless of liability. If the law imposes no
liability, the farmer will build the fence as a cheaper alternative than crop
destruction. If the law makes the rancher liable, she will pay the farmer to build
the fence (which is cheaper either than paying for crop damage or building the
fence herself).19 In the second case, a railroad traveling through farmland
releases sparks creating fires that damage crops of hundreds of farmers within
vicinity of the train’s path. Although the efficient solution may be for the
railroad to install equipment to prevent the engine from dispensing sparks,
whether this occurs depends on liability.20 If the railroad is not liable, it would
be insurmountable to organize the mass of farmers along the railroad’s route to

17. See generally Coase, supra note 2.
18. Id. at 15–16.
19. Id. at 2–6.
20. Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 577, 588
(1987), citing Coase, supra note 2, at 33.
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pay a proportionate share of the cost to the railroad for equipment installation.
In the latter case, the law needs to intervene.
There is a third case however, where the information is not perfect and
bargaining is not costless, but with sufficient incentives the parties can reach an
efficient agreement. In such case, this Article analyzes how legislative pressure
may persuade parties to overcome costs and reach the desired result. To
illustrate, the Article discusses the current controversy of under-the-table
payments by shoe companies to elite young basketball players and their families
to illustrate the Coase Theorem, and offers a more modest solution than
government intervention: legislative pressure to induce the parties to overcome
bargaining and information problems to reach an efficient and sociallybeneficial solution.
In Part II, the Article details how shoe companies compete to obtain
endorsements from star athletes by massive subsidies to youth basketball teams,
and by influencing high school athletes toward specific college basketball
programs. It discusses the costs of this approach, both to the shoe companies
and to the athletes’ potentially inefficient selection of college programs and
agents, as well as the side benefit of promoting access to elite competitions by
economically disadvantaged teenagers. Part III proposes a more efficient way
to market shoes through celebrity endorsement: including in the collective
bargaining agreement between the NBA and the NBPA a provision that NBA
players may not endorse shoe or apparel products except for the company that
officially sponsors the club for which they are employed. This Article asserts
that most of the money shoe companies would save from its massive indirect
effort to influence teenagers would instead go into substantially increased
payments to NBA clubs for official sponsorships; an efficient agreement would
allow NBA clubs to retain a modest increase in their current income but would
give an overwhelming percentage of the sponsorship money to the NBPA for
redistribution to its players. Further, there would likely be sufficient funds
leftover to provide organized support by the NBA and its players, perhaps under
the aegis of USA Basketball, for targeted funding to promote equal economic
access to youth sports. Under the proposed scheme, this Article argues that shoe
companies, the NBA, and its players (collectively) would all be better off, and
individual star players would be unharmed based on the redistribution formula
adopted by the NBPA.
Part IV describes why this is unlikely to happen, based on a narrative
understood by anyone with passing familiarity with the Coase Theorem. The
precise amount of shoe company savings, and likely investment in official NBA
club sponsorship, is unknown. At the outset of bargaining, NBA owners would
be unlikely to agree to give ninety percent of the marginal funds to the players.
Star players would be very reluctant to support a scheme that would endanger
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their lucrative contracts without knowing the precise formula the union would
adopt to redistribute funds. The NBPA would face pressure from stakeholders
who would lose out from a more efficient scheme, including corrupt middlemen
and legitimate agents who earn fees from player endorsements but not from
income redistributed by the union.
Part V suggests a less interventionist alternative than regulation: legislative
pressure. The facts and bargaining problems faced in securing a complex, multiparty understanding between shoe companies, the NBA, and its players are
significant, but not insuperable. This part suggests an illustrative model: Major
League Baseball’s (MLB) ability to overcome similar obstacles to secure an
agreement with its players union on drug testing for performance enhancing
drugs (PEDs). Bargaining problems kept the parties apart until Senator John
McCain, the chair of the Senate Committee on Commerce, credibly threatened
federal legislation to regulate this issue. Faced with the prospect that a
resolution to this complex issue might be subject to the political process, and
that inevitable modifications because of the dynamic nature of drug testing
would require returning to Congress, Commissioner Bud Selig and Major
League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) Director Donald Fehr overcame
bargaining costs to reach a solution.21 This Article suggests a similar result here:
a credible threat of federal legislation to regulate shoe endorsements would lead
to a market-based result reflection from the negotiation of the parties.
II. THE CURRENT MARKET FOR SHOE COMPANY ENDORSEMENTS
The shoe companies’ current scheme to target grassroots basketball is
designed to lure young basketball players into their brand for future
endorsement, if and when they become professional athletes. This Part
discusses the profitability of this scheme, how the shoe companies’ marketing
strategy distorts high school players’ selection of colleges, agents and managers,
and identifies inefficiencies in the current scheme. Finally, it analyzes the
benefits and downfalls of this strategy for youth basketball.
A. Overview of the current business model
Although only relatively few elite NBA stars have the fame to influence
significant purchases of shoes and other sports apparel, shoe companies have
recognized that waiting until a player establishes himself as a star is far too late

21. Larry Brown, Exploring John McCain’s Profound Impact on the Sports World, LARRY BROWN
SPORTS (Aug. 25, 2018), http://larrybrownsports.com/baseball/john-mccain-profound-impact-sportsworld/461521; Dana Milbank & Thomas Heath, McCain Threatens Baseball Over Drugs, WASH. POST, Dec.
4, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33702-2004Dec3.html.

ROSS – ARTICLE 30.1

16

1/10/2020 12:07 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1

to commence competitive bidding for his endorsement.22 Shoe companies now
focus on a wide array of efforts to influence the player’s decision much earlier
in their life and career. Aside from the actual compensation of an NBA player,
most of the companies’ investments fall into three major categories: (1) official
sponsorship of major college basketball programs; (2) funding national
tournaments under the auspices of the AAU; and (3) funding and sponsoring of
individual teams participating in AAU competition.
The official sponsorship approach can be illustrated by UCLA’s fifteenyear, $280 million deal with Under Armour.23 The deal states that “Under
Armour [will commit] to supplying an average of $7.4 million in clothing, shoes
and equipment each school year and contribute an additional $2 million over the
next eight years for upgrades at [UCLA athletic] facilities.”24
The recruiting process begins by sponsorship of tournaments and teams in
AAU competitions. The AAU summer leagues (hereinafter referred to as
“circuits”) provide a forum for AAU coaches, brand representatives and college
coaches to influence the prospect and his family to remain loyal to the shoe
company brand. Through the AAU circuits, AAU coaches and brand
representatives, and college coaches facilitate continuous dialogue with parents
and athletes, designed so the prospect will remain with the brand from AAU
until the NBA.25
At the AAU level, the shoe companies sponsor programs that
regularly feature top prospects, who are lured to a limited
number of teams that play in high-profile events sponsored by
the companies.
Shoe companies also sponsor high school and prep school
programs, but nothing is guaranteed. As with many AAU
teams, the loss of top talent may mean the end of shoe company
funding.

22. Brad Schmidt & Jeff Manning, Basketball Bribes: How Adidas Bankrolled a Black Market for Top
Teenage Talent, OREGONIAN, Feb. 4, 2019, https://www.oregonlive.com/business/2019/02/basketball-bribeshow-adidas-bankrolled-a-black-market-for-top-teenage-talent.html (“Adidas would help coaches at Adidassponsored schools identify and recruit high-school talent while having direct access to college players who
might be stars-in-the-making.” This article eludes to the fact that the corrupt scheme shoe companies perform
is predicated on identifying young talent in high school and monitoring these recruits progress toward stardom
and profitability through college to the NBA.).
23. David Wharton, UCLA’s Under Armour Deal for $280 Million is the Biggest in NCAA History, L.A.
TIMES, May 24, 2016, https://www.latimes.com/sports/ucla/la-sp-0525-ucla-under-armour-20160525-snapstory.html.
24. Id.
25. Estes, supra note 3.
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The setup creates an incentive for basketball coaches at all
levels to remain loyal to a shoe company brand — and have
players do the same — while also continuing to recruit fresh
talent on behalf of the shoe company.26
Shoe companies contract with universities to be the sole apparel provider to all
of the university’s sports teams. These agreements provide a two-fold return on
investment for the shoe company and the university. The shoe company benefits
from increased profits due to the fans/alumni of the university who purchase
their apparel. In addition, sponsorships provide shoe companies with
irreplaceable exposure to prospective NBA stars, to facilitate their agreement to
professional deals when the college stars make the NBA. In return, the
universities profit from the revenue contractually designated to them and by
having affiliation with the shoe brand. One report details how this scheme is
extremely successful for Nike:
Since 2003, roughly 80 percent of five-star prospects from
Nike-affiliated AAU or travel teams went on to play for a Nikesponsored college. Of all five-star players who reached the
NBA, roughly 87 percent of those who were affiliated with
Nike through youth teams and colleges continued to wear or
endorse those shoes as professionals.
Nike colleges landed more than 85 percent of the five-star
prospects who have signed with a school since 2003, and
roughly 75 percent of all of those five-star players who reached
the NBA wear or have worn Nike, compared to 18 percent for
Adidas and 3 percent for Under Armour.27
The shoe companies’ third major marketing expense is the cost of hosting
national tournaments in concert with AAU. Nike, Adidas and Under Armour
all sponsor circuits in which prospective players try out for a specific team.28
For example, Team Whynot, a Los Angeles based team, will hold tryouts at a
local high school or gymnasium.29 If selected by Team Whynot, the athlete
would become part of the EYBL circuit (Elite Youth Basketball League), owned
and funded by Nike. Nike will then supply the teen with apparel and shoes,

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Mike Enright, How Much Does EYBL Cost, RECRUIT LOOK (2015), https://recruitlook.com/dwqaanswer/answer-for-how-much-does-eybl-cost/ (explaining that most AAU teams charge a tryout fee between
$10 and $30, and a membership fee of $500 to fund facilities to practice and train, and to cover costs for
summer travel and tournaments, staff, and facility fees).
29. Team Whynot (CA), D1 CIRCUIT, https://www.d1circuit.com/page/show/4918376?subseason=
599727&tab=content (last visited Dec. 6, 2019).
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worth hundreds of dollars, and exposure to scouts and coaches from top Nikesponsored colleges, such as Kentucky, North Carolina, and Duke.30 Given that
AAU teams are non-profit organizations, they can hold fundraisers, seek
sponsors, and receive donations.31 These other sources of income are usually
designated for operating the team and helping economically challenged families
who struggle to afford the costs to participate with the team.32
Shoe companies spend significant capital operating their respective AAU
circuits. Each is comprised of numerous tournaments and teams. To illustrate,
the Nike Peach Jam is an end of the year tournament for Nike EYBL teams.33
The teams in Nike’s EYBL circuit who have the most success competing in
EYBL tournaments throughout the summer will qualify for the Peach Jam
invitational.34 The Nike Peach Jam exhibits games from 9:00 A.M. to 9:00 P.M.
for four days.35 Nike’s sponsorship deals with EYBL teams cover the costs of
travel concerning trips to tournaments around the country.36 In addition to
receiving apparel throughout the year, Nike provides EYBL players whose
teams qualify for the Peach Jam with exclusive shoes and apparel bearing the
Peach Jam logo (this year’s signature shoe will be the new Nike KD 11).37

30.
See Nike EYBL the Inside Scoop, HOOP DREAMS MAG. (May 23, 2013),
http://hoopdreamsmag.com/?p=6985 (discussing how EYBL players receive special edition shoes for
qualifying for the Nike Peach Jam tournament: “all players receive a custom pair of Nike EYBL sneakers
along with EYBL uniforms and an assortment of other gear”). See also SI Wire, How Adidas, Nike and Under
Armour Have Divvied Up Major College Basketball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.si.com/college/2017/10/02/adidas-nike-under-armour-contracts-schools-conferences
(identifying schools signing with each shoe company).
31.
Doug Green, Bottom Line: AAU A Money Machine, Q.C. TIMES (July 1, 2013),
https://qctimes.com/sports/high-school/basketball/boys/bottom-line-aau-a-moneymachine/article_b12456f6-607d-5fd1-9b8d-7d01d00aedb5.html.
32. Id.
33. See Nike EYBL the Inside Scoop, supra note 30.
34. Ricky O’Donnell, Everything to Know About Peach Jam 2018, Basketball’s Biggest Recruiting
Showcase, S.B. NATION (July 11, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2018/7/11/17552838/
peach-jam-2018-recruiting-college-basketball-cole-anthony-james-wiseman-duke-kentucky.
35. Peach Jam 2018: July 11–15, 2018, NIKE EYBL, https://web.archive.org/web/20190110193314/
http://www.nikeeyb.com/games/.
36. Donna Ditota, How Does AAU Basketball Work? Inside the City Rocks, Upstate NY’s Premier Team,
SYRACUSE (June 20, 2018), https://www.syracuse.com/sports/index.ssf/2018/06/albany_city_rocks
_grassroots_basketball.html (explaining what a Nike EYBL team goes through and providing some truth to
rumors about how EYBL teams operate. Ditota describes how City Rock’s EYBL team sponsorship with Nike
narrowly covers costs to “four required tournaments on the EYBL circuit (Dallas, Indianapolis, Atlanta, [and]
Hampton” and that teams must do well at these required tournaments to qualify for the Nike Peach Jam.).
37. Zach Schlemmer, Nike Readies a Limited Edition of Kevin Durant’s New Shoe for Annual ‘Peach
Jam’ Tournament, FOOTWEAR NEWS (July 9, 2018), https://footwearnews.com/2018/focus/athleticoutdoor/nike-kd-11-peach-jam-release-info-kevin-durant-1202585553/.
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Numerous
high-profile
individuals,
including
Nike-affiliated
representatives (coaches, scouts, managers and executives) will attend EYBL
tournament games featuring middle school and high school athletes. Their
strategy is to identify potential NBA talent early on, then monitor the prospects’
development as they mature.38 The main purpose of this identification is to
develop a rapport with those high school athletes identified as potential NBA
stars, and eventually sign the prospects to shoe deals when they turn
professional.39 The earlier these representatives locate talent, the more time they
have to evaluate a prospect’s worth, the potential for marketing their brand, and
to develop interpersonal relationships.40 The most successful scouts, brand
managers and executives will prioritize these players based on their talent, and
will try keep their prospects in their respective circuit throughout their amateur
basketball careers.41 Inserting themselves into the lives of these prospective
NBA stars is key to the shoe companies’ main goal: to gain an advantage in
endorsing the prospective stars when they are drafted into the NBA.42
These young men and their families are also exposed to corrupt business
managers, financial advisors, and coaches who are sometimes affiliated with a
shoe brand and work in concert to use their influence over high school athletes
to attend specific universities.43 According to one complaint challenging this
model, the “principal purpose” of the scheme “is to help Adidas artificially grow
and preserve market share in the ultracompetitive sneaker industry . . . [t]hrough
this exploitation of the young players’ images and likenesses to consumers . . .
Adidas profited.”44 Under-the-table payments, free merchandise, and exploiting
young men for the shoe brand’s profit is a part of the larger scheme to keep these
young men within the brand so the brand can profit from them when they are
professionals.

38. Schmidt & Manning, supra note 22.
39. Hobson, supra note 13.
40. See, e.g.,Oliver Maroney, The Life of an NBA Player Manager, BASKETBALL INSIDERS (Nov. 4, 2016),
http://www.basketballinsiders.com/the-life-of-an-nba-player-manager-randy-osei-thon-maker-anthonybennett-andrew-wiggins/ (explaining how Randy Osei met former number one draft pick Anthony Bennett
through playing AAU basketball, and how Tyler Ennis knew him since high school. He explains how his
extended relationship with the two gave him an advantage in becoming these players’ manager because he
has known them for long enough to gain their trust.).
41. Estes, supra note 3.
42. Marsha Durr, The Tipping Point: Mayhem in College Sports Requires Congress to Finally Intervene
in NCAA Governance, 8 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 26, 32 (2018) (explaining that the bribery scheme’s
main focus originated from a mutual agreement, which coaches to use influence over star athletes to steer
them toward certain athletic shoe companies, agents, and advisors).
43. Bowen Complaint, supra note 6, at 89–90.
44. Id. at 104.
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The major shoe companies compete aggressively to get elite players to join
their circuits. This competition includes extensive funding for a network of
AAU clubs. For example, the Oakland Soldiers (EYBL team), for whom
LeBron James and other NBA stars played as high school stars, will likely use
their NBA heritage as leverage to attract other high school phenoms across the
country to want to play for that team.45 These top high school players in turn
obtain greater exposure to college, NBA scouts, and get to compete against the
best players their age in the United States. Moreover, the teams from their
respective circuits will compete against each other and the top teams will then
compete in culminating national tournaments: Nike Peach Jam, Adidas Nations
and the Under Armour Association.
During these national tournaments each of the three major shoe companies
work in concert with college coaches and others with whom they have
relationships to persuade top talent to switch over to their circuit; alternatively,
they use the conference to obtain parents’ contact information in order to
influence their child to attend a certain college bearing their brand.46 Rick
Pitino, former head coach at the University of Louisville said, "[I]t’s a very
competitive thing by these shoe companies to get players. They’re going out and
recruiting like us, in the summertime. ‘Let’s get this kid to the (Nike) EYBL.
Let’s get this kid in the Adidas Nations.’”47
B. Cost to shoe companies, including how much spent on young players who
do not become stars.
The significant sums spent on AAU basketball became highly publicized as
a result of recent criminal convictions for bribing star recruits and their families.
This section suggests that much of the money shoe companies spend on youth
athletics is wasted, because the vast majority of teens do not become NBA stars
whose endorsements are valuable.
The case of Marvin Bagley, Jr., whose high school career was transformed
by money poured into his AAU team for which his father was the coach, is
illustrative.48 Bagley’s saga came to light when his parents filed for bankruptcy

45. Marc J. Spears, The Weekend Bay Area Trip that Helped Make LeBron James a Star, YAHOO (June
1, 2015), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/the-weekend-bay-area-trip-that-helped-make-lebron-james-a-star061242534.html.
46. Estes, supra note 3.
47. Id. (discussing Rick Pitino’s notion that shoe brand officials pursue young athletes from other circuits
and try to influence them to switch another brand’s circuit).
48. See Manning & Schmidt, Marvin Bagley III and the Loyalty Game: How Sneaker Dollars
Transformed Youth Basketball, OREGONIAN, Mar. 17, 2018, https://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/
page/the_loyalty_game.html.
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in 2008, with a combined family income of $44,000.49 Four years later, tax
forms in 2012 confirmed that the family listed a home in Southern California
valued in a range between $750,000 to $1.5 million.50 Marvin Jr. had attended
Sierra Canyon High School, a Nike-sponsored private institution, whose tuition
costs are $36,250 per year.51 Sierra Canyon refused to reveal details of its Nike
deal, but there was evidence that Nike merchandise-only sponsorships can
quickly exceed $10,000 a year for high school teams.52 In addition to cash
payments for sponsorship, Nike also pays money to the coaching staff and those
involved with the program.53
Although reporters have been unable to uncover the precise amount of
money Nike spent on the Bagley family, under the cloak of payments from Nike
to Bagley’s Nike-sponsored AAU team, his family was able to afford a better
life including affording an expensive private school.54 Unfortunately for Nike,
their investment went awry when Bagley signed a highly publicized five-year
deal worth $2 to $3 million a year with competitor Puma.55
The size of shoe company investments in payments to sponsored AAU
teams is significant. The Kentucky Travelers (EYBL team) “receive $35,000
per year from Nike, paid in two installments. The first $25,000 comes in March,
and the final $10,000 in June.”56 Further the team representative explained,
“[p]ayments from Nike cover the Travelers’ league entry, flights to
tournaments, van rentals, hotel stays and meals.”57 In addition to investing in
AAU teams and private high schools, Nike also sponsors numerous high-profile
high schools around the country, as well as hundreds of AAU teams.58
Major shoe companies also pay these prospects’ parents thousands of
dollars in an attempt to influence their son to attend a college program they

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Manning & Schmidt, supra note 48.
55. Nick DePaula, Marvin Bagley III Inks 5-year Shoe Deal with Puma, Sources Say, ESPN (June 14,
2018), http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/23795930/marvin-bagley-iii-signs-endorsement-deal-footwearapparel-endorsement-deal-puma.
56. Adam Himmelsbach, Club Team, Nike Reap Benefits of Sponsorship, COURIER J., Oct. 17, 2014,
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/basketball/2014/10/17/club-team-nike-reap-benefitssponsorship/17458415/Rines.
57. Id.
58. Darren Rovell, Shoe Company Wants Deal Maker’s Influence, ESPN (Sep. 23, 2016),
http://www.espn.com/sportsbusiness/news/2003/0922/1621525.html.
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sponsor.59 Recent criminal convictions revealed Adidas payments of $40,000
to the father of a star player being recruited by North Carolina State, and $90,000
payments to the mother of a Kansas recruit.60
Public information regarding funds spent on Nike AAU teams permits an
estimate of Nike’s expenditures. In the EYBL there are four divisions, with ten
teams in each division for three age ranges (15U, 16U and 17U).61 Four teams
multiplied by three age range groups equals 120 teams. Considering the annual
payment Nike pays the Kentucky travelers of $35,000 a year multiplied by 120
teams, this suggests that Nike spends around $4.2 million dollars on funding
EYBL teams alone (estimate not including women’s EYBL teams).62 This
calculation does not include Nike’s sponsorship of elite high school teams or
bribe money. In sum, Nike will spend well more than $4 million annually on
teenage boys, in an effort to steer them to Nike-colleges, in hopes this will
facilitate Nike’s ability to sign these young men to endorsement contracts should
they become NBA stars. Others tell of NBA players who have clauses in their
contracts requiring shoe companies to spend $150,000 to $165,000 on AAU
teams of their choice,63 suggesting this estimate may be low.
Because less than two percent of college players will get drafted into the
NBA,64 and less than one percent of high school players receive scholarship to
a Division I college program,65 Nike spends a significant amount on AAU teams
and potential prospects who do not earn a scholarship at a major college
program, much less play in the NBA at a level where their endorsement would
lead to profitable sales of Nike products.66 Although there are some benefits of
the current system to youth basketball and to the shoe brands, there is wasted
investment in those who participate within the circuits and in high school and

59. Will Hobson, Before this Hoops Recruit Chose Indiana, Adidas Made Sure He Stayed Under its Tent,
WASH. POST, May 16, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/before-romeo-langford-choseindiana-adidas-made-sure-he-stayed-under-its-tent/2018/05/16/2c77d384-539e-11e8-a5515b648abe29ef_story.html?utm_term=.794dc6012758.
60. Id.
61. For a list of the U17 Teams see 2019 Nike EYBL Divisions Announced, D1 CIRCUIT (Mar. 31, 2019),
https://www.d1circuit.com/news_article/show/1008627.
62. Himmelsbach, supra note 56.
63. Estes, supra note 3 (“NBA player Derrick Rose’s incentive-laden Adidas endorsement deal, for
example, requires the company to pay an AAU team or teams of his choice a total of $150,000 to $165,000
per year, plus as much as $85,000 in Adidas products — as long as the team is an Adidas affiliate.”).
64. Brice Fleckenstein, What Percentage of College Basketball Players Go to the NBA?, QUORA (Jan.
27, 2018), https://www.quora.com/What-percentage-of-college-basketball-players-go-to-the-NBA.
65. Patrick O’Rourke, Odds of a High School Athlete Playing in College, SCHOLARSHIP STATS,
http://www.scholarshipstats.com/varsityodds.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2019).
66. See, e.g., Himmelsbach, supra note 56 for an example of Nike spending $35k a year on one team
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do not proceed further. This wasted capital is an allocative inefficiency that
could be reinvested in a more efficient way at the professional level.
C. Distorting effect on selection of colleges
If shoe companies were not intertwined within youth basketball, there
would be a significant decrease of under-the-table payments. This would lead
to less corruption, reduced instances where an athlete forfeits collegiate
eligibility, saved expenses for shoe companies, and increased dispersion of
talent in collegiate basketball. Elite players seeking to play college basketball
would choose universities unbiased by under-the-table payments that come at
the expense of their ability to make independent decisions about their rights as
professional players. Their decisions, uninfluenced, can be tailored to the
quality of their education, their athletic development, loyalty to their home
region, and social concerns, rather than being steered to the university where
their matriculation is most valued by a shoe company with whom their AAU
team had been affiliated.
Shoe companies have taken advantage of the AAU process and made it their
own corrupt bidding auction. Adidas executive Jim Gatto’s recent conviction
demonstrates how shoe company representatives distort and funnel top
prospective athletes into top affiliate collegiate basketball programs.67 Once an
athlete tries out for an AAU circuit, it opens the door for those around the
prospect to influence him to stay locked into that circuit. Not only are these
prospects put on elite teams, they receive national recruitment, bragging rights,
free shoes and apparel, and notoriety from their peers.68 Just as a parent nurtures
their child with clothes, food, love and a roof to live under, shoe brands have
used AAU circuits to provide the similar essential means to prospective talented
basketball players.69 Absent the current competition to gain long-term
advantages from future stars, shoe companies’ capital allocated to persuading
prospective athletes — most of whom will not play professionally and will not
compete at profitable collegiate universities — and their families to attend a
67. See Jack Newsham, Ex-University Of Arizona Coach Cops to $20K Hoops Bribery Scheme, LAW 360
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.law360.com/sports/articles/1120767/ex-univ-of-ariz-coach-cops-to-20k-hoopsbribery-scheme?nl_pk=b8322f18-889c-4abe-b5b26e47f2229d11&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=sports&read_more=1
(“footwear company officials had paid athletes and their families to play ball for Adidas-sponsored schools in
hopes that they would stick with Adidas when they went pro after graduating”).
68. See David Cordova, Nike EYBL Starts Off In Hampton, DAVE’S JOINT (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://davesjoint.net/2017/04/24/nike-eybl-starts-off-in-hampton/. See also Nike EYBL the Inside Scoop,
supra note 30.
69. Spears, supra note 45 (illustrating a story of how AAU coaches provide hospitality for highly touted
prospects. Spears explains how head coach of the Oakland Soldiers allowed LeBron James to sleep on his
couch in order for him to compete for their team in the Elite 8tournament.).
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university will be reallocated toward investments more likely to secure a
return.70
D. Distorting effect on selection of agent and managers
When young elite athletes become professionals, they must make critical
business decisions in selecting agents and managers to negotiate contracts with
professional clubs, pursue endorsement opportunities, and manage their
finances.71 The recent case of former University of Arizona assistant basketball
coach Emmanuel Richardson illustrates how shoe company practices distort a
prospective athlete’s selection of these critical advisors. Richardson recently
pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery as he received “$20,000 from
undercover federal agents to refer college ballers their way for business.”72
The former Wildcats coach was caught on tape agreeing to refer
players to Munish Sood, a sports management exec turned
state’s witness, and his business partner Christian Dawkins in
exchange for envelopes of cash from two undercover agents
who were supposedly providing financial support to Sood and
Dawkins’s company. He choked up as he admitted as much to
U.S. District Judge Edgardo Ramos.73
As United States Attorney Geoffrey Berman explained, “Richardson, entrusted
to help players develop as athletes and young men, instead helped himself to the
cash offered by unscrupulous agents and financial advisers[.]”74
Another example is when,
[a] secretly recorded video played in New York federal court
showed Christian Dawkins, who is accused of bribing assistant
college basketball coaches in exchange for steering their
players toward his business management venture, handing cash
to former TCU assistant Corey Barker . . . Marty Blazer, a
former financial adviser who aided the government’s
investigation, testified that the cash was a $6,000 bribe, what
was to be the first for Barker to establish a long-term
‘relationship.’

70. Because the focus of this Article is how a new arrangement between the NBA and its players would
also benefit shoe companies, a complete discussion of the distorting effects of youth basketball corruption on
college basketball is beyond the scope of this Article.
71. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE & TIMOTHY DAVIS, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS AGENTS 20 (2003).
72. Newsham, supra note 67.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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That meant funding illicit payments to players Barker recruited
and monthly bribes, all in exchange for him using his influence
to steer players to sign with them for management services
when they go professional, Blazer said. 75
Agents can be family members, AAU coaches, or individuals affiliated with
shoe companies. Agents frequently have relationships with shoe companies and
AAU teams; the purpose of the relationships is to gain an advantage in signing
the best players contingent on them turning pro.76
Last month, the NCAA banned four AAU teams from the July
live period for having an association with an agent. New
England Playaz, Florida Rams and Worldwide Renegades had
to separate themselves from their program director, and the
players had to find a different team. SEBL Elite All-Stars was
allowed to stay intact, but needed to find a new coach. The
NCAA investigation stemmed from an email sent by prominent
sports agent Andy Miller to the program directors of the four
aforementioned AAU programs. In the email, Miller scolds the
four men – T.J. Gassnola, Matt Ramker, Desmond Eastman and
Tony Edwards – for not sending him enough first-round picks
in exchange for financial support.77
Shoe companies alter this process because they have established connections
with their own preferred agents. Shoe companies indirectly employ agents
because they pay the players the agents represent. Top players are likely to sign
with the top agents. Therefore, the AAU coaches, college coaches and others
affiliated with the shoe brand will steer a young prospect to sign with an agent
they know will convince the athlete to sign with their brand.78
It shouldn’t come as a surprise that many of the top AAU
programs have some association with agents. After all, when
these prominent programs are getting big money from Nike,
Adidas and Under Armour to be successful and produce pro
players, it’s hard to avoid sports agents. Agents funnel money
to certain AAU teams in an attempt to get a leg up on the

75. Zachary Zagger, Feds’ Hoops Trial Witness Explains Bribes Caught on Tape (LAW 360), Apr. 25,
2019, https://www.law360.com/articles/1153696/feds-hoops-trial-witness-explains-bribes-caught-on-tape.
76. Critical Coaches: How Deep is the Relationship Between Agents and AAU Programs?, CBS SPORTS
(Aug. 15, 2012), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/critical-coaches-how-deep-is-therelationship-between-agents-and-aau-programs/.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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competition when it comes time for a prospect from that team
to choose an agent.
Coaching one of the major AAU teams isn’t necessarily a
profitable exercise. It takes a financial commitment – or plenty
of financial backing. If the shoe companies aren’t providing
enough funding, a program director is more apt to listen to
agents or runners. Some college coaches also pointed to runners
and agents placing kids on shoe-sponsored teams – and then
giving money to said teams in exchange.
I spoke with several AAU coaches during the summer, and one
of the subjects that came up was pipelines between AAU
programs and sports agents.
‘If multiple players from my program have had success with the
same agent, it makes other players want to go to that agent too,’
one AAU coach said.79
In addition to agents, star athletes often select managers that, supplementing the
contract negotiation and endorsement-finding work of agents, assist the athlete
in everyday tasks similar to a personal assistant. “One night they could be
negotiating an endorsement deal, the next they could be helping a player with a
community event. [A manager’s] job is to help his players with whatever they
need, which can vary greatly from client to client.”80
Today’s professional athletes are similar to many small
businesses. The demands of the profession, the high amount of
income, and numerous ‘off the court’ factors have some
professional athletes choosing to hire a personal Business
Manager. Often this is a close personal friend, family member,
or representative from the Agents office.81
An example of how player managers spring into the lives of an NBA prospect
can be illustrated by Randy Osei and his connection to former number one NBA
draftee Anthony Bennet and current NBA player Tyler Ennis. He explains, “I
came into this business as Anthony Bennett’s manager. I am a few years older,
but Anthony and I were pretty close after playing on the same AAU team.”82
Tyler Ennis further describes that he has known Osei since middle school.83 A

79. Id.
80. Maroney, supra note 40.
81. Adonal Foyle, So What Does a NBA Business Manager Do?, ADONAL FOYLE (Jan. 8, 2016),
https://www.adonalfoyle.com/so-what-does-a-nba-business-manager-do/.
82. Maroney, supra note 40.
83. Id.
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manager can range from a close friend of the prospect to someone who is
affiliated with a shoe brand, including an AAU coach. The NBA journey and
many of the connections that last throughout NBA player’s career often begins
during the AAU circuits.
Some agents and managers essentially vie for prospects by soliciting
payments to the prospect or his family.
It can take different forms. Often a player has no idea he is
being played. Often his parents, coaches or friends — the
people he most trusts most — are active participants. And once
a prospect or his family takes the bait by accepting cash or plane
tickets or hotel rooms or any other benefit, the trap door snaps
shut.
With his amateur eligibility damaged, his basketball career may
no longer be his own.
...
‘Everybody is involved in this scandal. There’s nobody left
out,’ Sonny Vaccaro, a retired shoe company executive, told
Courier Journal on Saturday. ‘. . . The most important person in
the transaction is that high school kid . . . and he’s the poorest
of all of them. And they’re all bidding on his ability to play
basketball — to win championships, go to the Final Four, to sell
shoes, to sell suits, to put money in investments.’
...
‘If we take care of everybody and everything is done, we
control everything. … You can make millions off of one kid,’
sports agent Christian Dawkins allegedly told an undercover
FBI agent when asked how he could ‘guarantee’ a player would
sign with a particular financial adviser.84
The key distortion is that agents and managers are supposed to be zealously
pursuing the interests of their client, the athlete, while these illustrations
illustrate how instead agents and managers are steering their client to a shoe
company. When corrupt agents and managers develop relationships that
provide money to athletes in their families in the recruitment process, they can
then hold the prospect’s future hostage. This coercion is a subsidiary effect of
the current shoe company scheme that could be avoided if a new plan was
implemented.

84. Estes, supra note 3.
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E. Benefits to youth basketball
Counterbalanced against these distortions is one way in which shoe
company subsidies to AAU basketball meet an important social need. Unlike
baseball and ice hockey, where elite athletes ‘pay to play’ and youth sports often
exclude those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds,85 AAU basketball
provides the kind of competition that would be unavailable to some
socioeconomically disadvantaged athletes who only play high school
basketball.
That said, in the current age of social media, it would be unlikely for
professional scouts and college coaches not to notice a superior high school
talent playing solely for his high school team. As the NCSA observes, “recruits
can use the power of social media to contact coaches, show coaches what kind
of recruit they are and even gain the attention of college coaches who weren’t
previously recruiting them.”86 A recruiting advisor suggests that “[s]ocial media
can have a significant impact on your college recruiting journey. Since anyone
can take a screen-shot and share it, nothing you post is ever really private
anymore.”87
For example, current NBA forward Otto Porter, Jr., did not participate in
AAU and only competed with his high school team.
. . . the 24-year-old Washington Wizards forward [is] an
anomaly in today’s NBA. Almost all of the sport’s young stars
played AAU (Amateur American Union) ball during their
teenage years, as the league’s long been known as a place for
players to face elite competition while gaining exposure to
college and pro scouts. It’s not that Porter wasn’t good enough
to play AAU—plenty of teams would’ve loved to have him.
But his father, Otto Porter Sr., believed it would be better for
his son’s development to train and play in their hometown. That
may sound crazy when you consider that Porter grew up in
Sikeston, a rural town in southeast Missouri . . . Yet here’s

85. Stephen F. Ross & Michael James, Jr., A Strategic Legal Challenge to the Unforeseen Anticompetitive
and Racially Discriminatory Effects of Baseball’s North American Draft, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 127,
130 (2015) (explaining that the essay “articulates the arguments that can be marshaled to potentially persuade
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the FTC, or the courts to find the Rule 4 draft illegal, or at
least to raise sufficient doubts to motivate MLB clubs to alter their anticompetitive and antisocial rules”).
86. How to Use Social Media for Recruiting, NCSA, https://www.ncsasports.org/recruiting/contactingcollege-coaches/social-media (last visted Dec. 6, 2019).
87. Fred Bastie, Recruiting Column: The Effects of Social Media on College Recruiting, USA TODAY,
Dec. 13, 2017, https://usatodayhss.com/2017/recruiting-column-the-effects-of-social-media-on-collegerecruiting.
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Porter today, a max-contract player with one of the most wellrounded skill sets in the NBA. 88
Young athletes and their parents prioritize participation in AAU over high
school basketball for several reasons. First, AAU competitions provide greater
exposure. Second, college coaches and NBA scouts want to see the best players
compete against each other. Third, AAU not only helps the top players in the
country improve their individual skills, but also aids NBA scouts in evaluating
potential draftees and shoe company representatives evaluate who they want to
endorse in the future. Further, young athletes get the immediate satisfaction of
playing for teams backed by their childhood NBA heroes such as Russell
Westbrook, Chris Paul, Carmelo Anthony and many more.
Nike’s Elite Youth Basketball League, which concluded earlier
this month in Augusta, Georgia, with its annual Peach Jam
Tournament, is a prime example of this business model. The
tournament includes signature PEs and this year’s pool has
teams backed by NBA players Chris Paul, Carmelo Anthony,
and Bradley Beal, all of whom have endorsement deals with
Nike or Jordan Brand. Moreover, Harry Giles, De’Aaron Fox,
and Jayson Tatum—the third, fifth, and 20th selections in this
year’s NBA Draft, respectively—were all standout performers
in the 2015 Peach Jam.
All three players played college ball at Nike-sponsored
schools—Tatum and Giles at Duke, Fox at Kentucky—and
have inked endorsement deals with the Swoosh since turning
pro. If you’re a teenager who’s got skills and an obsession with
basketball, why would you NOT want to be a part of that?89
In addition, if the parents are a coach or team manager, they can receive funded
trips around the country on the shoe company’s dollar.
Further, although qualifying for a state championship or state tournament
can improve a young athlete’s skills, it remains less effective than participating
in an AAU tournament like the Nike Peach Jam, where they compete against
the best in their age in the country.
When talking to a college coach, he mentioned that it matters
little to him how the player does during the season. Athletes
could put up huge numbers but those don’t matter a ton because
88. Brandon Hall, Why Otto Porter Jr. Didn’t Play AAU Basketball (And Believes He’s Better Because
of It), STACK (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.stack.com/a/why-otto-porter-jr-didnt-play-aau-basketball-andbelieves-hes-better-because-of-it.
89. Morgan McDaniel, How AAU Is Dominating High School Basketball, COMPLEX (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.complex.com/sports/2017/08/aau-is-dominating-high-school-basketball.
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it could be against bad competition. These coaches want to see
them on the AAU circuit or at their camp during the summer. It
allows the college coaches to work with them and see them
against better competition.90
To circumvent AAU, some top players would transfer to basketball prep
schools.91 However, with states enforcing more rules limiting student transfers
and discouraging recruiting, some players have deserted their high schools to
put more emphasis on the AAU process.92
Although AAU basketball benefits an elite teen player’s chances of
recruitment and success, fundamental aspects of basketball that are lost. College
coaches, NBA coaches and prominent stars criticize AAU basketball. Steve
Kerr, current head coach of the NBA’s Golden State Warriors complains,
“[w]hat trouble[s] me [is] how much winning is devalued in the AAU structure,
. . . The process of growing as a team basketball player — learning how to
become part of a whole, how to fit into something bigger than oneself —
becomes completely lost within the AAU fabric.”93 NBA great Kobe Bryant
expressed his dissatisfaction with AAU basketball:
I hate it because it doesn’t teach our players how to play the
right way, how to think the game, how to play in combinations
of threes. . . I got lucky because I grew up in Europe and
everything there was still fundamental, so I learned all the
basics.94

90. Is AAU or High School Basketball More Important in the Recruiting Process?, RECRUITING 101 (Mar.
19,
2018),
http://www.recruiting-101.com/2018/03/19/aau-high-school-basketball-important-overallrecruiting-process-2/.
91. Scott Rieger, The Tale of Brandon Jennings: Cautionary or Revolutionary?, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec.
5, 2008) https://bleacherreport.com/articles/89514-the-tale-of-brandon-jennings-cautionary-or-revolutionary
(explaining how Brandon Jennings transferred from his local high school in Compon, CA Dominguez Hills
High School to Oak Hill Academy in Mouth of Wilson, VA); Sam Gordon, Findlay Prep Honors Alum Avery
Bradley During Blowout Victory, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Nov. 6, 2018) https://www.reviewjournal.com/nevadapreps/np-basketball/boys-basketball/findlay-prep-honors-alum-avery-bradley-during-blowout-victory1713419/ (explaining how Avery Bradley transferred from Bellarmine Prep in the Tacoma, WA area to
Findlay Prep in Las Vegas, NV); Michael Scotto, Ben Simmons and D’Angelo Russell: From High School
Teammates to ‘Blood for Blood’ NBA Playoff Opponents, ATHLETIC (Apr. 23, 2019)
https://theathletic.com/939960/2019/04/23/ben-simmons-and-dangelo-russell-from-high-school-teammatesto-blood-for-blood-nba-playoff-opponents/ (explaining how D’Angelo Russell transferred to Montverde
Academy, FL from high school in Louisville, KY.).
92. Bob Cook, In High School Sports, Transfers are Creating Just Two Classes of Teams, FORBES, Feb.
26, 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2014/02/26/in-high-school-sports-transfers-are-creatingjust-two-classes-of-teams/#1a50e6b2481b.
93. Joshua Eferighe, Is AAU Ruining Basketball? How This Generation of NBA Stars is Different,
KULTURE HUB (June 7, 2017), https://kulturehub.com/aau-basketball-nba-stars/.
94. Id.
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Duke Coach Mike Krzyzewski observed that “the influence of the AAU
programs on young players is that there is no structure to guide the coaches in
developing leadership skills.”95 This is unsurprising: shoe company-sponsored
AAU competitions are designed by the shoe companies to promote their
individual players’ talent for the benefit of NBA scouts and big-time college
coaches, not to display fundamentals or even win games. Consequently, AAU
critics note, in despair, that young players devalue winning, lack leadership
qualities, and lack fundamentals. In high school, a coach’s incentive is to
develop talent and win games, while the AAU coach’s incentive is to place the
most players in college and hopefully to the NBA.
To be sure, some elite players who do not become NBA stars are better off
under the current scheme. These include those who thoughtfully and willingly
receive under-the-table benefits understanding that if successful they will be
subject to relentless pressure to sign with agents and shoe companies that may
not serve their future interests. Others may need less training in fundamentals
and experience playing for winning teams, and so benefit from free travel and
merchandise afforded by the shoe company scheme. Many others, however,
particularly those from underprivileged areas where their parents cannot afford
private coaching, would have greater opportunities for success if youth
basketball focused on high schools and properly-supervised USA basketball
teams whose goals were winning and fundamentals and not brand promotion.
In sum, shoe companies make huge investments in youth basketball, which
appear to be inefficient, as well as leading to corruption and criminal behavior.
Although youth basketball yields benefit to promising young talent, these
benefits can be gained through other, less corrupt, organizations such as USA
basketball. Part III will discuss how money will be saved by shoe companies,
and how our proposal would be more profitable for shoe companies, NBA
players, and the league, as well as setting the stage for athletes to receive better
training and have access to better coaching and competition under the aegis of
USA basketball.
III. A MORE EFFICIENT SOLUTION: EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS WITH NBA CLUBS
There is a more efficient and socially-desirable approach than the current
business model that major shoe companies use to attract athletes’ product
endorsements. In this Part, we describe our proposal to shift shoe company
endorsement money to those NBA stars whose endorsements will create sales,
through a new provision in the NBA collective bargaining agreement giving a

95. Coach K Shares His Thoughts on AAU, WINNING
https://winninghoops.com/news/coach-k-shares-his-thoughts-on-aau/.
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team’s official shoe sponsor exclusive negotiating rights to obtain shoe and
apparel endorsements from the club’s players. We analyze how this scheme
will result in significantly more shoe company funds invested in NBA team
sponsorships, and how redistribution of most of this money back to the players
followed by a further redistribution by the NBPA to its players will leave the
players in as good of a financial position, if not better, than they would be in
without our scheme. Finally, we suggest that there will be enough money after
the redistribution of funds to NBA players to support and fund youth basketball
under the auspices of USA basketball.
A. The proposal
The market distortions and inefficiencies from competition among shoe
companies to spend millions to recruit young prospects could be avoided if
compensation were focused entirely on NBA stars. We therefore propose an
agreement between the NBA and the NBPA granting an NBA team’s official
shoe and apparel sponsor with exclusive rights to negotiate the endorsements of
players contracted to that club for covered products. The agreement would still
require a separate agreement between players and shoe companies for
endorsement and transfer of name, image and likeness (NIL) rights, but would
preclude players from endorsing or using their NIL rights to aid rival
companies.96 To illustrate, if our proposal had been in effect this year, we
suspect Nike would win the bidding to sponsor the New Orleans Pelicans; Nike
would then separately negotiate an NIL agreement with Zion Williamson, who
would also receive a huge sum as part of the redistribution of funds from Nike
to the Pelicans to the NBPA. Although Williamson’s deal with Nike would
reflect his inability to negotiate with Under Armour, he would be free to do
nothing, or to devote all endorsement efforts toward other products.
A provision of the collective bargaining agreement limiting the ability of
players to obtain competing bids from shoe companies for their services would
96. Although precise details would be negotiated by skilled attorneys for the NBA and the NBPA, we
imagine that the official shoe company would have limited rights to all players’ likenesses in team photos, but
any other use of player NIL rights would require a separate endorsement deal. Some athletes claim that they
have safety or competitive reasons for preferring a particular shoe. To separate these legitimate concerns from
commercial considerations, under our proposal athletes would be permitted to wear shoes from a non-club
sponsor, but would be required to cover up trademarks or other design traits that would identify the brand of
shoe worn. See, e.g., Adam Himmelsbach, Shoe Companies Pay Millions for Walking Ads, COURIER J. (Oct.
20, 2014), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/basketball/2014/10/17/schools-shoe-dealsmake-long-lasting-ads/17458387/. (“At Kentucky, if an athlete has to wear a non-Nike shoe for medical
reasons, the brand must be taped over and it cannot be promoted by the university.”). It is noteworthy that,
when this paper was presented at a Penn State faculty seminar, legendary women’s volleyball coach Russ
Rose claimed that over his long career at a Nike-sponsored school, none of his players had been unable to find
a Nike shoe that was appropriate for athletic competition.
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significantly increase the value of official sponsorship rights with each NBA
club.97 The public recognizes NBA players as celebrities, “whose name[s]
[have] attention-getting, interest-riveting and profit generating value . . . .”98
Because NBA players have celebrity “attributes such as reputation, likeability,
believability and attractiveness, several businesses invest in celebrity athletes to
establish connections between their brand and high-profile athletes.”99 As with
other businesses, NBA teams invest in players by offering them contracts in
exchange for their services. Given NBA teams are their own brands and
businesses, their acquisition of a top tier NBA star is of utmost value for their
team brand.
Celebrity endorsement is valuable to an NBA team because NBA stars
essentially “lend their image”, and relatable characteristics to the team allowing
the team to connect with fans to boost sales and increase profits.100 Essentially,
NBA players favorable characteristics positively drive purchasing behavior of
consumers.101 In turn, consumers driven by the characteristics of an NBA player
will have a positive subsidiary increase on profits for NBA teams. For
illustration, LeBron James’ move to the Los Angeles Lakers raised ticket prices
by over 400%.102 Further, his Los Angeles Lakers number twenty-three (23)
jersey was the best-selling jersey in the NBA, further boosting overall profit for

97. Peter Verry, How to Get Kawhi Leonard’s Sold Out New Balance Shoes, FOOTWEAR NEWS, May 8,
2019,
https://footwearnews.com/2019/focus/athletic-outdoor/how-to-get-kawhi-leonard-new-balancesneakers-1202780552/ (Consider the decision of NBA star Kawhi Leonard to shift his endorsement deal from
Nike to New Balance. His branded shoe sold out within minutes of the shoes being up for sale to the public.).
See also, Matt Welty, New Balance Bet on Kawhi Leonard and Won, COMPLEX, (June 14, 2019),
https://www.complex.com/sneakers/2019/06/new-balance-bet-on-kawhi-leonard-and-won (stating that the
“true value of Leonard and New Balance lies in him wearing New Balance before games. We’ve come to a
point where people care more about what NBA players wear before the game than what they during it.”).
98. Abeza, et al., The World’s Highest-Paid Athletes, Product Endorsement, and Twitter, 7 SPORT, BUS.
& MGMT. J. 332, 334 (2017).
99. Id.
100. Id. (explaining that “[M]arketers use star players’ appeal to endorse sport and non-sport products,
and their likeable and trustworthy persona to positively influence consumers’ purchase decisions.”). Id. At
332. At the same time, we are skeptical that customers purchasing Kawhi Leonard’s new New Balance shoes,
did so based on a perception of quality endorsement by an expert. See generally Verry, supra note 97. As
several observers have noted, affinity with celebrities, rather than the sincerity or motivation underlying the
celebrity’s endorsement, seems to be driving sales. Concerns about ‘sincerity’ have dissipated. See, e.g.,
Lauren Myers, A Picture Is Worth A Thousand Material-Connection Disclosures: Endorsers, Instagram, and
the Federal Trade Commission's Endorsement Guides, 66 DUKE L. J. 1371, 1375 (2017) (citing Kevin YC
Chung, Timothy P. Derdenger & Kannan Srinivasan, Economic Value of Celebrity Endorsements: Tiger
Woods' Impact on Sales of Nike Golf Balls, 32 MARKETING SCI. 271, 271 (2013)).
101. Abeza et al., supra note 98, at 334.
102. Jessica Golden & Eric Chemi, LeBron James Effect Boosts Lakers Ticket and Merchandise Sales,
CNBC (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/05/lebron-james-effect-boosts-lakers-ticket-andmerchandise-sales.html.
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the Lakers.103 His presence alone has boosted the Lakers overall profitability,
and ticket prices for away games as well.104
Under our proposal, the increased shoe sponsorship income would be
largely turned back to the NBPA for redistribution to players. Clubs would be
acting, in effect, as wholesalers of image rights. Superficially, players would
receive significantly less for their individual shoe endorsement deals. Although
the shoe company that is the official sponsor of each player’s club will continue
to generously compensate a player for his endorsement and use his individual
image rights, the exclusive right means the player’s leverage is reduced to
opportunities for endorsements with products of a different category. However,
if properly structured, the total amount that major shoe companies will pay
should increase, and the scheme will monetarily compensate these players
through a redistribution from NBA franchises. An efficient agreement would
allow NBA clubs to increase their current income, while returning the
overwhelming percentage of the sponsorship money back to the NBPA for
redistribution to players. Such an agreement would likely ensure that the NBPA
would have sufficient funds to ensure that star players who would have received
lucrative shoe deals are as well off as if they had been able to secure such a deal
under the current system.
B. How the proposal will transfer money spent on AAU teams to the NBA
The proposal will channel millions that shoe companies spend funding
summer youth circuits for the purpose of developing potential endorsement
contracts more efficiently toward those players whose endorsement will actually
benefit shoe companies. Instead of funding AAU teams for the primary purpose
of securing loyalty from players who may never achieve professional success
and distorting decisions of those that do, shoe companies would re-allocate
funds to secure exclusive negotiating rights through an NBA team sponsorship.
Although shoe brands receive a significant amount of revenue and benefits
from marketing universities and their fanbases, sponsoring an NBA team would
be more valuable. Currently shoe companies spend as much money on
endorsements with a single NBA player than an affiliate university. To
illustrate, Adidas spent $200 million dollars securing James Harden’s
endorsement,105 significantly exceeding Adidas’ $160 million endorsement
103. LeBron, Lakers Top NBA’s Most Popular Merchandise Lists, NBA (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://www.nba.com/article/2019/04/25/top-merchandise-jersey-sales-2018-19-season-official-release.
104. Golden & Chemi, supra note 102.
105. Sam Amick, James Harden Agrees to $200 Million Shoe Contract with Adidas, USA TODAY, Aug.
13, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/rockets/2015/08/13/james-harden-adidas-shoe-contract
/31634809/.
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deal with the University of Louisville.106 This suggests that the value of a
university sponsorship as a means to drive sales among avid fans of that
university is far less, and implies that even contributions to major programs like
Louisville are driven to a significant degree by the shoe company’s hopes of
gaining a competitive advantage in signing former Cardinal hoop stars to
professional endorsement contracts.107
Likewise, LeBron James’ value to Nike is reflected in Nike’s sales of his
signature shoe, which rose thirteen percent annually to $340 million in 2014 and
topped $400 million in 2015.108 UCLA men’s basketball, while endorsed by
Adidas, brought in $12.3 million a year in average revenue for the school.109
Although shoe companies would continue to offer modest sponsorship deals to
colleges, a shift of shoe company investment from grassroots basketball circuits
and collegiate sports to the NBA would be more efficient.
C. How the proposal significantly increases revenues to the NBPA
The proposal uses the collective rights of the players to ensure that shoe
company endorsements more efficiently target those players who actually drive
consumer purchases, with the NBA clubs acting in part as wholesale agents
collecting a sizable fee.110 For this proposal to succeed, when individual NBA
teams contract with one of the major shoe companies, the vast majority of the
incremental money that NBA clubs will receive under the new scheme will need
to be redistributed to the NBPA, which will then transfer the funds back to the
players. To minimize harm to current expectations, all existing players would
be excluded from the agreements, and going forward the NBPA would likely
106. Jeff Greer, University of Louisville Releases Details of $160 Million Adidas Contract, COURIER J.,
Aug. 25, 2017, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2017/08/25/universitylouisville-announces-adidas-apparel-contract-extension/600482001/.
107. David Southorn, Boise State Athletics to Extend Nike Deal Through 2025, I.D. STATESMAN, (June
12, 2018), https://www.idahostatesman.com/sports/college/mountain-west/boise-state-university/boise-statefootball/article212983494.html (demonstrating Conferences less likely to attract NBA stars attract even
smaller amounts in sponsorship dollars). For example, the Mountain West conference team Boise State
University signed an extension with Nike for a total of $12.16 million through the 2025 season, and Colorado
State University obtained an $11 million deal with Under Armour. Id. It is difficult to explain this difference
solely in terms of the relative number of fans of the Louisville Cardinals, Boise State Broncos, or Colorado
State Rams.
108. Leo Sun, Why Nike Inc Signed a Lifetime Deal with LeBron James, MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 19, 2015),
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/12/19/why-nike-inc-signed-a-lifetime-deal-with-lebronja.aspx.
109. Cork Gaines, The 25 Schools That Make the Most Money in College Sports, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 13,
2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/schools-most-revenue-college-sports-2016-10.
110. An NBA club sponsorship has independent value for sponsors beyond their ability to secure
individual endorsement with players, and the opportunity to activate player/club endorsement has symbiotic
effects.
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adopt a formula that compensates top stars in a manner that permits them to
receive, when combined with their substantial but reduced income from
individual deals, an amount equivalent to that which they would receive under
the current system.
The proposal’s aim is to create a sufficient increase in payments likely to
secure positive investment returns for shoe companies, and that the result is
superior for the league and its players. NBA teams will achieve a marginal
increase in sponsorship revenue even if the bulk of increased funds go back to
the players. The lump-sum payment to the NBPA will allow star players to be
compensated according to their worth, with additional funds available to support
other players.
D. Enough money left over to support youth basketball
If crafted properly, the proposal will permit the shoe companies to reduce
overall spending by substantially eliminating wasteful and often corrupt
spending on teenagers, while providing more money to clubs and to players
collectively. In addition, it should create additional surplus funds that would be
available, if the owners and players would agree, to fund youth basketball
programs. The legitimate purpose of allowing prospective collegiate athletes to
obtain exposure for college scholarships can be done under the auspices of USA
basketball, the official governing board for the sport and operator of youth
representative teams in international competition.
Currently, USA Basketball invites the best high school players in the
country to represent the USA.111 The team is sponsored by Nike and they play
other countries in an Olympic style format through FIBA (The International
Basketball Federation). The goal would be to operate youth USA basketball as
European clubs do with their youth teams,112 and avoid criminal consequences
from coaches and shoe company executives without stifling a high school
athlete’s ability to participate collegiately.
Shoe company subsidies for AAU basketball fill a strong need for
development and exposure for elite players from poor, rural, or working-class
families.113 Traditionally, development and exposure was filled by high school

111. See Eighteen Finalists Remain for 2018 USA Men’s U18 National Team, USA BASKETBALL (June
3, 2018), https://www.usab.com/news-events/news/2018/06/mu18-finalists.aspx.
112. See, e.g., Jack Holmes, Soccer’s 10 Best Youth Academies, PASTE (Mar. 31, 2015),
https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2015/03/soccers-10-best-youth-academies.html.
113. See McDaniel, supra note 89 (“It’s an enticing pitch; give exclusive gear and a chance to meet NBA
stars to the kids, while guaranteeing little to no out-of-pocket cost to the parents—in the form of generous
allowances for travel and lodging—and in exchange, the coaches influence players to sign with schools that
have sponsorship deals with the companies that are bankrolling the entire operation.”).
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basketball, which attracted major public attention and exposure.114 In some east
coast cities like New York City, local parks put on summertime informal
competitions on urban hardcourts that received the same attention as an AAU
tournament would today.115
As an illustration, a popular tournament was a summer pro-am league called
the Entertainers Basketball Classic (EBC) hosted at Rucker Park in New York
City. These teams were owned and sometimes coached by popular hip-hop
artists and urban celebrities such as Jay Z, Sean “Diddy” Combs, and Fat Joe.116
The EBC at Rucker Park has hosted NBA stars ranging from Allen Iverson and
Kobe Bryant to more recent LeBron James and Kevin Durant.117 Touted high
school basketball players would be able to get a chance to compete against the
NBA stars. An example is current Los Angeles Laker Lance Stevenson. Then
enrolled in Lincoln High School, Lance was able to show his talents at an EBC
game where he scored twenty-seven points against two NBA guards: Nate
Robinson and Jamal Crawford.118 The EBC allowed Lance to get exposure to
celebrities and college coaches and also gave him a chance to compete.119
If the business model for shoe companies changed, where would poor kids
get access to training, development, and exposure? For many reasons, it is
unclear if high school basketball will retain its former luster, as high school
football still does. Unlike Europe or Latin America, elite players will not be
trained in academies run by professional clubs seeking to sign players at age
sixteen. In the United States this business model runs afoul of NCAA
regulations, as high school kids are not permitted to receive payment from a
professional club.120 Consider current NBA player Enes Kanter, he received
more than “$33,000 in impermissible benefits” in exchange for his basketball

114. Id. (“AAU has long supplanted traditional high school hoops programs as the premiere destination
for collegiate recruiting.”).
115. See, e.g., Cal Griffin, The Entertainers Basketball Classic, ALL THINGS HOOPS (Aug. 13, 2017),
http://www.allthingshoops.com/the-entertainers-basketball-classic/.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. David Astramskas, Top 10 Lance Stephenson Moments from GM4 Vs the Cavs, BALL IS LIFE (Apr.
23, 2018), http://ballislife.com/top-10-lance-stephenson-moments-from-gm4-vs-the-cavs/.
119. Lance Stephenson Is Born Ready, STARTING FIVE (Jan. 15, 2008) , https://thestartingfive.
wordpress.com/2008/01/15/lance-stephenson-is-born-ready/ (explaining how Lance Stephenson “followed up
his Sophomore City Championship with a New York State Championship and became the youngest player to
play in the [Pro-Am] division at EBC (Rucker Park). Although the championship game featured five NBA
players, Stephenson was named its MVP and since then has been actively recruited by every major college
program in the country.”).
120. See NCAA Division I Manual, rule 12.1.2(d), page 64.
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services from a Turkish club during his high school years, and the NCAA
declared him ineligible to compete in NCAA games that season.121
Further, there is no incentive for NBA clubs to create basketball academies
to train elite players, because players cannot be signed by the sponsoring
academy due to their young age and would be subject to the NBA draft.122 This
point can be illustrated by the controversy of developing young talent in the
MLB. MLB teams can sign foreign players younger than American players, and
the foreign players are usually retained by the team that develops them,
warranting a return on their investment.123 In contrast, if MLB teams spent the
money to make youth academies in America, they would not be able to sign
American youth due to their age, and MLB teams funding these academies
would risk a no return on their investment because the young prospects would
be subject to the MLB draft and subsequently drafted by any team.124 Moreover,
“the return on investment in scouting and developing foreign players is far
greater than the return on investing similar effort in young American
ballplayers.”125 However, NBA teams have no incentive to create basketball
academies because it would be a wasted investment of funds.
Although NBA club-run basketball academies are not viable options today,
USA Basketball is an appropriate organization to oversee grassroots basketball,
with the potential for young athletes to receive benefits of training and
leadership not currently available in AAU competitions.126 USA basketball
routinely attract the best coaches and training personnel that provides the
athletes with a forum to leave egos aside, maximize their talent and compete
with our country across their chests. USA basketball has been working in
concert with the NBA to promote better youth basketball through a standard
created by USA basketball and the NBA.127 Although, AAU provides a
competitive environment with qualified coaches and premier training designed
to highlight individual skills for college coaches and NBA scouts, USA
basketball creates an opportunity for kids to be coached and trained by former

121. ASSOCIATED PRESS, NCAA Rules Kentucky’s Enes Kanter Permanently Ineligible, ESPN (Jan. 7,
2011), http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/news/story?id=6000134.
122. See Ross & James, supra note 85, at 133.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.at 131.
126. Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 784 (1990)
(noting that AAU provides a competitive environment with qualified coaches and premier training designed
to highlight individual skills for college coaches and NBA scouts, USA basketball creates an opportunity for
kids to be coached and trained by former NBA players, NBA coaches, and the most well-respected collegiate
coaches in the country).
127. Youth Basketball Guidelines, NBA https://youthguidelines.nba.com/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2019).
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NBA players, NBA coaches and the most well-respected collegiate coaches in
the country.128 If reaching the NBA is that prospective athlete’s goal, then the
benefits surrounding USA basketball would be an acceptable alternative route.
For those primarily concerned about the welfare of elite underprivileged
athletes, the optimal solution is, of course, a regulatory change permitting them
to be compensated directly for endorsement deals. This would require
overhauling NCAA rules, a topic beyond the scope of this Article. Under the
current scheme, these athletes are rarely paid, and if they paid under-the-table,
they risk serious consequences if discovered. A large segment of elite teens
would, we concede, lose the benefits of free apparel and perhaps some reduction
in free trips to tournaments were elite amateur teams sponsored by USA
basketball and designed to develop fundamental skills rather than promote an
apparel brand. We submit that this cost is outweighed by benefits to even these
athletes of freedom from distorted decisions and the benefits to a greater number
of young players from channeling youth sports through a non-profit governing
entity.
IV. WHY THIS IS UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN
We acknowledge the informal reaction from almost any knowledgeable
observer to our proposal: it is very unlikely to happen. Although many accept
our claim that the proposal is an efficient change in contract rights, for change
to occur—specifically NBA players limiting their ability to exploit endorsement
opportunities and image rights for shoe and sports apparel contracts—an
enormous payment by the NBA to the union would be required and then an
enormous redistribution back to the players. What is theoretically possible is
not always viable in reality. Our proposed scheme will not work unless parties
are willing to overcome significant information asymmetries and bargaining
costs.
This part explores these information asymmetries and bargaining costs
associated with obtaining NBA club and player approval to implement our
proposed scheme. First, we identify the uncertainty of information regarding
the amount of money that will be redistributed and how redistribution will work.
Second, we discuss the bargaining costs pertaining to reaching an agreement,
and how the parties could be expected to overcome these bargaining problems
because of the business acumen and intelligence of the parties to the deal.
128. USA Basketball Men’s U18 National Team, USA BASKETBALL (2018), https://www.usab.com/mens/
u18/roster.aspx (showing the roster for the 2018 U18 Men’s Basketball team). The bottom of the page lists
former NBA player, Danny Manning, and current University of Kansas coach, Bill Self, as well as Anthony
Grant who is the current coach at the University of Dayton. See id. It is clear that these high school kids are
getting premier basketball development from the best basketball minds in America.
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A. Information problems
Even if the parties were to seriously consider our proposal, they would be
faced with the lack of accurate information about the sums involved, which
makes it difficult for any stakeholder to conclude that they would be better off
under our proposal than with the status quo. The total sum that shoe companies
are likely to spend securing sponsorships with NBA clubs, which would secure
them exclusive rights to endorsements by each club’s players, is in part a
function of the total costs that major shoe companies spend on AAU programs
and under the table payments made to high school phenoms’ families. These
costs are plainly uncertain. Major stars lack information as to whether the
NBPA’s redistribution formula would fairly compensate them for their loss of
leverage to obtain competitive bids from rival shoe companies. Advocates of
youth sports lack information as to how poor and working-class players will
receive training, development, and exposure if shoe company subsidies are
substantially reduced.
B. Bargaining problems
Bargaining costs are the costs required to come to an acceptable agreement
with the other party to the transaction. As Professor Hovenkamp explains:
Social costs exceed private costs only when the costs of
producing a bargain are so high that the market is unable to
yield an efficient outcome. This might occur because there are
too many bargainers, or the bargainers have imperfect
information about relevant facts or the applicable law, or
perhaps because they have opportunities to behave
strategically. For example, if someone proposes to build a
refining plant in a residential area, and the plant’s smoke will
injure 10,000 home owners, but each rather slightly, the costs
of bargaining might prevent the plant owner from
compensating the 10,000 for their losses (assuming the plant
owner is liable), even though the value of operating the plant is
greater than the losses imposed on the 10,000 home owners.129
If there are too many bargainers, there is a very high probability that every party
will not receive adequate compensation or receive what they are owed.130 In the
illustration above, is it impossible to compensate the surrounding 10,000
affected citizens, if legal liability is presumed. This leads the parties to take the

129. Hovenkamp, supra note 126, at 784.
130. See id.
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more expensive litigation route.131 A court would consider the circumstances
and likely provide damages for a select few of the 10,000 citizens who are
affected more than the others.132 The court’s decision is in conjunction with the
hopes that this serves as an incentive for the plant to invest in better technology
to fix their pollution problem harming the immediate citizens.133
Hovenkamp also analyzes why strategic behavior can cause problems:
The strategist might always threaten to walk away unless he
receives a larger share of the surplus, and he might occasionally
walk away in order to make his threats credible. This multibargain strategy might be profitable for him if the larger shares
of the surplus he obtains from the sum of the successful trades
outweigh his losses from the occasional trade where he carries
out his threat. This creates a prisoners’ dilemma situation. If all
the strategist’s opponents held firm in insisting on half of the
surplus, the strategy would not work. But, acting individually,
each opponent might find it individually maximizing to
complete the bargain and take less than half of the surplus,
rather than risk not completing the bargain at all and losing all
the surplus. 134
Hovenkamp concludes that the strategic bargainer will not be awarded the
opportunity to be strategic where information is perfect.135 However, in real
life, perfect information rarely exists. Parties may not know if a bargainer is
bluffing, or if information provided is misleading or inconsistent.
The hopes for an efficient solution, however, are not as bleak as discussed
in Coase’s train example and Hovenkamp’s air pollution case. Unlike hundreds
or thousands of unorganized and unsophisticated farmers or homeowners, NBA
players are well organized and represented by sophisticated union leaders with
expertise in law, business, and marketing that represent the player’s profit
maximizing interests. Further, the NBA owners, who would have to agree with
the scheme, have selected an influential, innovative, and equally sophisticated
commissioner in Adam Silver to represent them. Only a few shoe companies
(Nike, Adidas and Under Armour) are the most relevant bargainers along with
the NBA and the NBPA. Given the business acumen, expertise, and few
numbers of parties to this transaction they are more than capable of overcoming
significant bargaining and information costs that would exist.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 790-91.
Id. at 791.
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Another difficulty is that, although the proposal is likely to enrich the NBA
and its players and allow shoe companies to spend more efficiently, other
influential stakeholders will be harmed and will use their influence to block the
proposal. Player agents, for example, are likely to be adversely affected because
they will not receive a monetary percentage from the redistribution of licensing
income from the NBA to the NBPA to their clients. Corrupt and non-corrupt
youth sport coaches paid handsomely by the shoe companies will also suffer.
Formally, these parties have no say. Collective bargaining agreements are
solely between the NBA and the NBPA.136 Things that are discussed and
negotiated are: “base salaries of players, the number of games they will play per
season, whether their contracts are guaranteed by the league, player transfer
procedures, their medical coverage, retirement plans, injury and non-injury
grievances, club discipline procedures and access to the personal files/data of
players.”137 Agents have a duty to their clients to educate themselves and their
clients (NBA players) on the NBA bargaining agreement; however, they do not
affect nor have their self-interests reflected in the actual negotiations.138
V. ALTERNATIVE: LEGISLATIVE PRESSURE
An alternative approach to overcoming significant bargaining and
information costs is through legislative pressure. The Coase theorem explains
why the NBPA, NBA and the shoe companies will have issues reaching an
agreement. The lack of information and high bargaining costs are significant
hurdles, but these are not insurmountable obstacles. Because sports leagues
typically do not face marketplace pressure to reach efficient agreements in the
face of significant but not insuperable bargaining costs, another way to facilitate
optimal results is the threat of legislative intervention. Congress has done this
before, when Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain threatened
MLB and the MLBPA with federal legislation regarding performance enhancing
drug use, resulting in a mutual agreement.139

136. Collective Bargaining Agreements in Sports: How do They Work in the United States vs Europe,
MONEY SMART ATHLETE BLOG (Aug. 29, 2018), http://moneysmartathlete.com/2018/08/29/collectivebargaining-agreements-in-sports-how-do-they-work-in-the-united-states-vs-europe/.
137. Id.
138. Leigh Steinberg, How To Be A Great Sports Agent – Contract Negotiations, FORBES,July 11, 2016,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/2016/07/11/how-to-be-a-great-sports-agent-contractnegotiations/amp/.
139. Brown, supra note 21.
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A. Coase theorem applied: costs significant but not insuperable
An efficient result is difficult to achieve in an environment that lacks the
perfect information and costless bargaining posited by the Coase Theorem for a
self-correcting market. This is particularly true where risk aversion makes it
unlikely the parties will act on their own. In these cases, an external force may
provide sufficiently more information and assist the parties in overcoming
bargaining costs in order to achieve an efficient result. Though these bargaining
costs are high, where the number of parties are limited, they should be able to
negotiate with each other to reach an agreement.
An excellent vehicle to accomplish these objectives are legislative hearings.
Congress can justify hearings because it has plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce.140 Legislative proposals could include regulation of youth sports,
regulation of payments by shoe companies, hearings to determine why so many
professional athletes sign endorsement contracts with the shoe company that
sponsored their college team, and greater auditing of endorsement expenses.
None of these proposals would be supported by the major stakeholders, just
as no baseball stakeholder favored government intervention into player doping.
However, through consideration of these proposals, Congress can gain
information about shoe marketing and basketball, and its negative and positive
effects on society.
Legislative hearings can bring forward information the parties need to reach
a bargain. Congressional investigators could unearth information on the total
sums shoe companies spend on AAU basketball, including the amounts spent
on AAU teams, reliable estimates of the amount of under-the-table payments,
and professional player contracts. This information would allow the NBA and
NBPA to calculate how much money shoe companies would save and how their
reinvestment at the NBA level will attain the same or even better success than
the shoe company’s current scheme.
Even with better information, bargaining costs may still preclude an
efficient result. Suppose, for illustrative purposes, that the NBA clubs would be

140. Shoe marketing and basketball are undoubtedly interstate commerce under modern definitions.
NCAA rules regulating matters such as shoe marketing in basketball “affect interstate commerce, because
they regulate transactions between [persons] and their schools in multiple states nation-wide.” In re Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal.
2019) (holding that NCAA rules that capped the amount of compensation they are permitted to receive
violated federal antitrust law and had severe anticompetitive effects). A related case explained that “the
modern legal understanding of ‘commerce’ is broad, ‘including almost every activity from which the actor
anticipates economic gain.’” O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th Cir.
2015) (holding that NCAA compensation rules could be subject to antitrust scrutiny). Shoe marketing and
basketball are both activities from which shoe companies, the NCAA, the NBA, and all ages of athletes
involved seek to anticipate economic gain.
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better off even if they shared all but 10% of the increased sponsorship income
with players, while players would be better off even if the owners kept 30%.
Under this scenario, the parties may be unable to reach an agreement on the
appropriate sharing. Furthermore, bargaining costs may preclude the efficient
result, but this is highly unlikely when the NBA and NBPA observe the amount
of funds the shoe companies will save and reinvest into their organization.
The late Senator John McCain succeeded in this regard in similar
circumstances. During McCain’s career he had significant influence on the
reformation of baseball and other sports. He recognized the impact of
professional athletics on the youth of the United States and saw this as justifying
pressure on the MLB to enact better standards for performance enhancing drugs
(PEDs).141 Legislative hearings demonstrated the prominence of performance
enhancing drugs in baseball.142 The MLB’s standards regarding PED usage was
initially very lenient; many players could use PEDs during the season by
circumventing the testing process.143 Congress was concerned about the effects
of PEDs on youth.144 As young athletes turned into promising baseball
prospects, they would be susceptible to an introduction to PEDs through a
professional trainer, who might explain how his childhood heroes use them. The
pressure to use PEDs to gain a competitive advantage led many to risk severe
long-term consequences from injury or some of PED’s harsh side effects.145
Initially, the MLB and the MLBPA could not reach an agreement because
of the harshness of suspensions and randomness of testing.146 Owners sought
harsher and longer penalties for testing positive for PEDs.147 Conversely, the
MLBPA was heavily opposed to drug testing; this was “due to concerns about

141. Brown, supra note 21.
142. STAFF OF COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 109TH CONG., HEARING ON STEROID USE IN BASEBALL H.R
DOC. NO. 20515-6143, at 7-10 (2005), available at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.
oversight.house.gov/files/documents/20050317183306-12546%281%29.pdf).
143. Zachary D. Rymer, Full Timeline of MLB’s Failed Attempts to Rid the Game of PEDs, BLEACHER
REPORT (June 10, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1667581-full-timeline-of-mlbs-failed-attemptsto-rid-the-game-of-peds.
144. H.R Doc. No. 20515-6143, at 5-6.
145. Associated Press, Parents Say ‘No Doubt’ Steroids Killed Son, ESPN, (Mar. 17,
2005)http://www.espn.com/mlb/news/story?id=2015717 (“Rob Garibaldi shot himself in the head on Oct. 1,
2002, at the age of 24. For years, he had been told that he had all the ingredients of a major league baseball
player except size, so he started using steroids to gain the bulk he needed to make the bigtime. The price, in
Raymond Garibaldi’s words, was ‘mania, depression, short-term memory loss, uncontrollable rage, delusional
and suicidal thinking and paranoid psychosis.’”).
146. Rymer, supra note 143.
147. MLBPA History: The 2000’s, MLB PLAYERS (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.nmnathletics.com/View
Article.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=34000&ATCLID=211157644.
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respecting players’ ‘legitimate privacy and due process rights.’”148 Both sides
finally agreed to “more severe penalties for first and second-time drug
offenders: first-time offenders would be suspended eighty games, and secondtime offenders would be suspended for an entire season of 162 games without
pay.”149
To facilitate agreement, Senator McCain, acting in his role as Commerce
Committee Chairman, threatened federal legislation if MLB did not introduce a
harsher drug policy:
Major league baseball players and owners should meet
immediately to enact the standards that apply to the minor
leagues, and if they don’t, I will have to introduce legislation
that says professional sports will have minimum standards for
testing . . . I’ll give them until January, and then I’ll introduce
legislation.150
Soon thereafter, the MLB introduced its Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment
Program.151 The program included more comprehensive testing as well as
significantly harsher penalties to discourage cheating. “What I care about are
high school athletes who are tempted to use steroids because they think that’s
the only way they can make it in the major leagues,” McCain explained.152
Just as Senator McCain worried about the effect on youth of PEDs, shoe
company corruption also affects youth athletic opportunities. The Senate
Commerce Committee Chairman would be similarly justified in intervening to
pressure the NBA, NBPA and shoe companies to create an alternate scheme that
does not have a negative impact on our country’s youth.
B. Applying these lessons to the shoe controversy
Legislative pressure may be needed to facilitate an agreement between the
NBA, NBPA, and shoe companies. The MLB was under pressure from
Congress because Congress made PEDs an illegal substance prohibited by the
Federal Controlled Substances Act.153 The illegal acts of fraud and bribery that

148. Zackary Kessinger, “Strike Two, You’re Out!” the Need for A More Stringent Drug Policy in Major
League Baseball, 10 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 257, 259 (2018).
149. Id. at 266–67.
150. Brown, supra note 21.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Edward Lazarus, Congress’ Decision to Subpoena Former Baseball Players to Testify, CNN.COM
(Mar. 29, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/17/lazarus.steroids/.
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surround the shoe scandal are all crimes punishable by months or years in
prison.154
The illegality of the criminal acts arising out of the scandal in youth sports
gives Congress leverage to pressure major shoe companies as well. Subpoena
power with the resulting possibility of further criminal investigations, as well as
public hearings, can force shoe companies to cooperate with the NBA and its
players to reach a solution, negotiate a deal, and end the fraud, racketeering, and
bribery that is ruining elite high school basketball players’ ability to participate
in collegiate athletics and receive a college education.
VI. CONCLUSION
Youth sports face recurring problems regarding access and development of
elite players. In basketball, shoe companies have created a system that is both
monetarily inefficient and detrimental to youth basketball players and their
families, shoe companies and universities. Under-the-table payments by shoe
companies have led to criminal indictments, compromised the careers of college
coaches, and have hindered talented young basketball players from reaching the
NBA and receiving a college education. Yet the current scheme can be resolved
with transparency and cooperation between the relevant parties: the major shoe
companies, the NBA and the NBPA. The business acumen, legal expertise and
knowledge possessed by these parties leave no excuse to maintain the current
scheme instead of reforms where most everyone involved will be better off.
However, bargaining costs and information asymmetries sometimes get in
the way of even the most capable parties to a deal to reach an agreement. Unlike
the bi-modal scenarios developed by Ronald Coase, these obstacles may be
overcome with legislative pressure. Where the marketplace will not drive actors
to efficient solutions and government regulation is not preferred to private
agreements, public policy justifies pressure on the parties to reach an agreement.
However, given the few parties to this potential deal, legislative pressure in the
form of the credible threat of government regulation combined with hearings
and other techniques to gain additional information may be all that is required.

154. Schmidt & Manning, supra note 22.

